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Gaius Julius Caesar was a ruthless military leader, a dangerous politician, and a
cunning historian. “A General’s Self-Depiction” examines an important episode in the
Commentarii de Bello Gallico to assess the political motivations underlying the account.
The details of Caesar’s first British expedition (55 B.C.E.) are scrutinized for deliberate
inaccuracies and strategic shadings of the truth to disclose the long-term political goals
behind the nuances and “spin” of his British narrative. I prove that Gaius Julius Caesar was a
calculating, purposeful man, who had both stated and self-interested unstated goals in nearly
every undertaking.
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THE POLITICAL STRATIGIES OF GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR AS SEEN IN THE
COMMENTARII DE BELLO GALLICO

Gaius Julius Caesar was a meticulous, deliberate man, who never acted without purpose. To
properly understand his contributions to history, one must first understand the goals behind
his actions. To accomplish this, we must scrutinize his Commentarii de Bello Gallico.1 The
first section will offer a brief history of Caesar’s political career up to and during the Gallic
Wars. The second section will summarize his account of the British landing, as an example
Caesar’s written works, which many historians consider to have possible inaccuracies. The
third section will examine in more detail his depiction of both his failures as a general and
any possible ulterior motives for the expedition. The final section will discuss the social and
political value of his Commentarii. In the end, I will show that Caesar utilized his
Commentarii de Bello Gallico as a means of propaganda to justify his military conquests,
manipulate the masses, and imprint his seal on the letter of history.
Caesar’s Political Goals:
Born in 100 B.C.E.2, Gaius Julius Caesar quickly grew to have an astute ability to learn and
apply lessons both taught and observed. During his younger years Caesar, a member of a
long line of Roman nobility, observed Sulla marching on Rome and breaking the most
important rule in Rome (to never enter Rome with an army), the ensuing civil war between
Marius and Sulla and finally the death of his uncle Marius during his seventh consulship.

1

Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).
Subsequent parenthetical references are to this edition of the Bellum Gallicum (BG).
2
Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996),
xlvii; Christian Meier, Caesar: a Biography, trans. David McLintock (New York: MJF Books, 1982), 51.
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Living up to his noble name, at a young age Caesar showed strong political
aspirations. Beginning in 69 B.C.E. Caesar rose in the Roman political ranks, first as
quaestor in Spain, then acquiring the rank of aedile in 65. However, the first step towards
total power came in 63 B.C.E when Caesar became pontifex maximus (in charge of the state
religion), which offered him a golden opportunity to increase his social standing. More
importantly, however, Caesar held a “front rank [in] Rome’s senatorial aristocracy,”3 which
offered an invaluable learning experience.4
Caesar learned that social popularity was the key to political power and that only
through money could one rise in the political ranks. This coupled with an army marked the
backbone of the Roman governmental structure. Moreover, upon the victorious return of
Pompey from the east, Caesar learned another valuable lesson, which would in turn bring
about the fall of the res publica: service of Rome did not necessarily bring about political
respect.5 At this point, Caesar stopped working in service of Rome and began working
solely for himself.
After the Bona Dea scandal and subsequent divorce of his second wife, Pompeia, at
the end of 62, Caesar in early January of 61 hastily took a governorship in Hispania Ulterior,
a province in southern Spain. However, creditors, whom Caesar paid with a loan from
Crassus, hindered his appointment. In Spain Caesar declared, “I for my part would rather be
the first man here than the second man in Rome,” 6 thus laying the seeds of authoritarianism.
Having a taste of absolute power, Caesar wanted to test the waters back in Rome. To
achieve his goal of political power, he adopted an alliance with two people who

3

Meier, 162.
Meier, 133-166.
5
Meier, 178.
6
Meier, 182.
4
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compensated for what Caesar lacked. Caesar had ambition, yet little money or military
power. Thus, in 60 B.C.E., Caesar along with Marcus Licinius Crassus, the richest man in
Rome, and Rome’s military legend Pompey the great, created the first triumvirate. Its aim
was “to realize jointly certain objectives that they had failed to achieve alone.” 7
Consequently, Caesar achieved the highest rank in Rome, that of consul, in 59, with
the promise to receive a province to govern. Caesar, however, had a promise to keep: he had
to put legislation through for both Crassus and Pompey. Many in the senate, however,
opposed this, primarily because they could see the rationale behind his action; the senate
adopted a new tactic, essentially “a boycott on politics.”8 Eventually Caesar upheld his end,
and both Pompey and Crassus were content. Again, however, Caesar learned the Roman
political scene was no place for a man of ambition; it simply hindered his aspirations.
Finally, the senate granted Caesar the province of Gallia Cisalpina for five years,9 marking
the beginning of Caesar’s formal transition from politician to general.
Between 58 and 55 B.C.E., Caesar began to institute his own form of leadership and
to consolidate the whole of Gaul, tribe by tribe. In 58, the Helvetii started a mass migration
through Caesar’s province (BG 1.7). Upon hearing word of this, Caesar denied the Helvetii
relocation because of the memory of consul Lucius Cassius’ death at their hands (BG 1.7).
Ultimately, Caesar made use of this opportunity to initiate full-scale war on the Helvetii and
eventually all of Gaul. Once the Helvetii and their allies had been decisively defeated,
suffering 258,000 casualties (BG 1.29), Caesar moved on to Ariovistus and the Sequani,
who had initiated hostilities against the Aedui (long-time friends of Rome). Again, this

7

Meier, 188.
Meier, 211.
9
Meier, 213.
8
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marked another Roman victory, as the second in a long line of Gallic tribes who opposed
Caesar fell because of that choice. 10
The following year Caesar moved northward to conquer the Belgae, who were
reportedly plotting against the Roman people (BG 2.01). He spent the whole of 57
consolidating his control of the Belgic tribes and pushing forward toward the Rhine River.11
The following year, Caesar pushed to the western coast of modern-day France, suppressed
upheavals, subdued the maritime tribes, and made the initial steps to cross to Britain.12 He
had up to that point suffered no formal defeat, in turn offering both total control of Gaul, and
immense wealth.

Caesar’s Commentary on the British Landing:
As Caesar admits, it was late in the campaign season, and in this part of the world, “winter
[came] early” (BG 4.20). However, rather than consolidating the rest of eastern Gaul and
setting up proper winter quarters, he decided to undergo a risky operation: to cross the
channel and invade Britain. Ancient scholars like Pytheas, who preceded Caesar, and
Diodorus Siculus and Pliny the Elder contributed only fragmented accounts to Roman
knowledge of Britain.13 Nevertheless, at Caesar’s time the image of Britain was of, “a place

10

Caesar, BG book 1; “Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul (58-50),” Athena Review 1.4 (1998).
http://www.athenapub.com/caesarg1.htm (24 Nov 2003).
11
Caesar, BG book II.
12
Caesar, BG book III.
13
Thomas Rice Holmes, Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar (London: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1907), 219.
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beyond the limits of the Romans’ world.”14 Even though Britain was spectacularly far from
Rome (both geographically and in the Roman imagination), it is only roughly twenty-five
miles from Gaul and many of the Gallic tribes had received British auxiliaries in previous
engagements against Caesar; that made the Britons enemies of the Roman people.
Moreover, a reconnaissance would be important prior to a larger invasion. Caesar attempted
to gather intelligence about his destination from merchants who crossed over to Britain for
trade, but no one could offer much information. Specifically, Caesar needed a reliable
account of “the numbers of peoples living there, their skill in warfare, their established
customs, or which harbors were suitable for a fleet” (BG 4.20). Consequently, Caesar sent
Gaius Volusenus to reconnoiter the destination (BG 4.21).
While Volusenus was gone, Caesar traveled to the land of the Morini, namely Portus
Itius, where the channel crossing was shortest, to gather his fleet constructed the previous
year to face the maritime tribes (BG 3.09), and to prepare for the crossing. Envoys from both
Britain and a majority of the Morini approached Caesar. The former promised obedience to
Roman rule of Britain, while the latter apologized for previous attacks on the grounds of
ignorance, and pledged their allegiance to Caesar and the Roman people (BG 4.21). This
pleased Caesar, for he did not want to leave his back exposed, and it was too late in the
season to undertake a campaign against the Morini before the British landing (BG 4.22). By
this point Caesar had accumulated eighty transport vessels, however, poor weather forced an
additional eighteen vessels off course. He judged the former sufficient for the British
crossing, since only two legions, the VII and X, were departing; the latter were assigned to
carry their cavalry. Before leaving, Caesar commissioned Quintus Titurius Sabinus and

14

P.C.N. Stewart, “Inventing Britain: the Roman Creation and Adaptation of an Image,” Britannia, 26

(1995) 3.
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Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta to lead the rest of his army against the Menapii and the districts
of the Morini who had sent no envoys. Moreover, Publius Sulpicius Rufus was left the
essential task of maintaining a safe harbor (BG 4.22). After these preparations, Caesar took
advantage of some good weather and embarked around midnight, ordering the cavalry to
follow as soon as possible.
Arriving early the next morning, Caesar’s men spied opposing forces stationed on
the cliffs overlooking the beach, and concluded the situation unfavorable for a landing,
therefore Caesar ordered the fleet to travel six-and-a-half miles up the coast, hoping for a
more advantageous landing point on an open shore (BG 4.23) (see fig.1-2). However, the
Britons typically used very mobile battle chariots; because of this, they had already moved
into position to counter the Roman landing by the time the ships arrived. Since Caesar’s
transport vessels had deep hulls, they could not be beached, and the solders had to both find
their footing and fight in deep water (BG 4.24). Caesar observed the crisis facing his men
and ordered the warships to be maneuvered to the exposed flanks of the Britons. This
slowed the Britons’ assault and allowed the Romans to turn the tide. At this point the
aquilifer (eagle-bearer) of the X legion appealed to the gods, and shouted, “Jump down
soldiers, unless you want to betray our Eagle to the enemy—I at least shall have done my
duty to the Republic and to my commander” (BG 4.25). With this rallying cry, the aquilifer
jumped overboard and marched towards the heart of the battle. This in turn rallied the
Roman solders and induced them to go over the side too, ultimately leading to a rout of the
opposition (BG 4.26).
Four days after the initial skirmish, the cavalry transports set sail; however, upon
their approach, a sudden, fierce storm forced many back, while others were flung westward
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down the coast (BG 4.28). Moreover, due to a full moon, the high tide, coupled with the
ferocity of the storm, damaged many of the original transports and warships as well (BG
4.29). This troubled Caesar, for, since the expedition was not meant to be lengthy, he had
not requisitioned food for his troops while still in Gaul; moreover, with the sole means of
transportation in shambles, Caesar ordered immediate safeguards to offset every eventuality.
He hoped to buy enough time to find food, repair his ships, and construct suitable defenses
to protect his diminutive camp (BG 4.30). He did find ample grain in the fields surrounding
his camp, though not without problems; on one occasion, legion VII was violently ambushed
while gathering grain and might have fallen but for Caesar’s prompt rescue.15
After the ships were finally repaired, Caesar took advantage of clear weather and
ordered a return to the Gallic mainland before the approaching autumnal equinox. However,
two of the transports were unable to hold course and were forced to land further south, in the
land of the Morini (BG 4.36). As Caesar recounts, 300 men disembarked and marched
towards Portus Itius but were attacked by Morini in hopes of booty. A contingent of 6000
Morini surrounded the smaller Roman body but found no easy victory. On hearing of this
skirmish, Caesar ordered the mass of his cavalry to their assistance (BG 4.37). The charging
horsemen forced the Morini to retreat. An infuriated Caesar assigned Titus Labienus to
discipline the Morini for their renewed hostilities. He then retired to his winter quarters in
the land of the Belgae (BG 4.37).

Examination of Caesar’s Account:

15

J. F. C. Fuller, Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier, and Tyrant (New Brunswick, NJ: Da Capo Press,

1965), 122.

10

A GENERAL’S SELF-DEPICTION

PHILLIPS

The first expedition to Britain was problematic from the get-go; this is evident in Caesar’s
account. There are three clear elements worth discussing: first, Caesar’s unnerving
command decisions; second, his motives for action; finally, his depiction of events.
Ultimately, Caesar was determined to utilize the first British expedition as a political and
economic catapult.
Caesar’s operation in Britain was a decision stemming from arrogance and terrible
judgment. First, by his own admission, it was late in the season; in fact, it was late August,
which offered little room for error.16 Moreover, because of the time of year, the seas were
more treacherous, another problem in an already unpredictable situation. The campaign was
doomed from the onset. Ultimately, the unfortunate results of the operation could have been
avoided, if the British expedition had been put off until the following year.
Caesar had little knowledge of his destination, apart from folklore. He attempted
unsuccessfully to acquire reliable intelligence on Britain from local tribes and traders, but
“no one could properly inform him about the land and its people.”17 To compensate for the
lack of reliable intelligence, Caesar sent Gaius Volusenus ahead to conduct a thorough
reconnaissance and to report back with great speed. Volusenus returned five days later, but
with very little to offer Caesar. He had not even disembarked, for fear of “[putting] his
safety in barbarian hands.”18 Thus, Caesar had very little of substance to plan an operation
around. This lack of intelligence, combined with the time of year, and subsequent weather
conditions, made Caesar’s decision ill advised, even foolish.

16

Fuller, 122.
Meier, 281.
18
Meier, 80.
17
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Finally, Caesar hurriedly outfitted and organized the British expedition. The
expedition was “so hastily equipped that supplies of food were not taken.”19 Also, Caesar
left his cavalry to cross over later—both serious miscalculations right at the outset. At first
glance the operation would seem to be only a short-term engagement. However it is always
proper in time of war to prepare for the unseen, in this case by requisitioning an appropriate
amount of food. Moreover, cavalry was of the utmost importance in ancient warfare.
Though the Romans were not cavalry dependent, embarking without an integral part of his
forces left Caesar with a “one-armed army,”20 able to repel and attack, but unable to pursue.
Caesar misjudged the complexity of the British expedition. Why did he take such
risks in mounting the first British expedition, and what were his underlying motivations for
this hasty, ill-conceived expedition?

Caesar’s Ulterior Motives:
When Caesar decided to invade Britain, he offered two rationales: first, the Gauls had “in
almost all our wars” (BG 4.20) received auxiliaries from that area; thus the Britons were by
definition enemies of Rome. Second, he deemed it valuable simply to gain first-hand
knowledge of Britain for a future expedition, saying “it would be a great advantage to…land
on the island and observe the…people…localities, harbors, and approaches”(BG 4.20).
However, were these Caesar’s only motives? If not, what might have enticed a general to
place his army in unwarranted danger?
Caesar clearly wanted to pacify Gaul, and by 55 B.C.E. he had done so
magnificently. All that remained were revolts and loose ends. The former could only be

19
20

Fuller, 121.
Fuller, 74.
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dealt with once they erupted; however, the latter were within Caesar’s present capabilities.
Thus, at first glance, Caesar had realistic and plausible goals in crossing to Britain.
However, he had ulterior motives for endangering an already glorious campaign season.
The nullification of British support for the Gauls could only be achieved through an
armed expedition, but why not wait for the right moment? Patience in this situation would
have offered many advantages: Caesar might have found better intelligence or been
contacted by more British envoys. The weather would not have been as formidable a
concern at the onset of a new season. One expedition might have been enough, if more
discretion had been shown. Why undertake so hastily a voyage of such importance and
complexity? The answer lies in Caesar’s secondary motivations.
Caesar demonstrated great determination in the execution of the expedition to
Britain. Revenge, overconfidence, money, and power all seem plausible reasons for that
determination. Caesar wanted revenge for his men who had fallen under a British sword. In
the year prior, the Aremoric tribes had revolted while Caesar was absent for winter.21 Upon
his return, the Osismi, Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambriliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii all
commenced hostilities with British support, causing Caesar marginal losses (BG 3.9).
Feeling invincible, Caesar set out to extract retribution for his losses; this, however, simply
reflects Caesar’s account.
Money and prestige were the real motivations for Caesar’s British expeditions. In
May 54 B.C.E., Cicero wrote to Trebatius Testa in Gaul saying, “I hear in Britain there is
not an ounce of either gold or silver. If that is so, I advise you to capture some war-chariot,

21

“The Landings of Caesar in Britain, 55 and 54 BC,” Athena Review 1.1 (1996).
http://www.athenapub.com/caesar1.htm (24 Nov 2003).
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and post back to me as soon as you can.”22 This suggests Cicero thought money was a
possible motive for the first expedition. Moreover, with the British landing, Caesar
mimicked Pompey’s eastern conquests, but on a grander scale.23 Furthermore, it offered
political and financial prestige in Rome and counterbalanced the social standing of the
consuls of that year, Pompey and Crassus, Caesar’s political allies. Both are compelling
reasons to justify a rash stream of decisions, which doomed the mission from the onset.

Caesar’s Account—Accurate Reporting or Devious Propaganda?
It is important to judge whether Caesar’s account accurately depicts these problems. Does
Caesar, in his Commentaries, explain why he made such ill-conceived decisions before and
during the expedition? And does he tell the truth about his reasons for invading Britain? Or
does he simply offer a façade?
Caesar acknowledges the mistakes he made during the first British campaign. He
admits he started too late, lacked intelligence, and departed Gaul without his cavalry.
However, does a mere reference accurately portray the importance of such miscalculations?
Caesar simply mentions these errors and then distracts the reader from them by highlighting
thrilling moments, such as the heroics of the aquilifer in the British landing (BG 4.25).
Furthermore, Caesar hardly mentions his poor organization and planning, or the
relative failure of the operation as a whole. On one occasion, the VII Legion was ambushed
while gathering the daily ration of grain for the camp (BG 4.32). If Caesar had brought
proper rations from Gaul, this problem would not have occurred. Yet, Caesar offers this

22

Cicero, Letters to His Friends, trans. W. Glynn Williams, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,

1959), 29.
23

Meier, 281.
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event not as a failure in planning on his part, but rather to show his omniscient ability to
save all. In every crisis Caesar’s depiction stresses not the failure of the event, but his
abilities as a general.
Finally, Caesar occasionally gives a census of enemy dead, but rarely of his own
losses. He either states individual fatalities outright, as was the case in the death of Piso (BG
4.12); uses ambiguous references like “hard pressed” (BG 4.32), or “receiving only a few
wounds” (BG 4.37); or omits casualties altogether, for example, after the first British
landing. Caesar carefully decides what numbers to discuss and what to exclude. Logically
the Roman public would adore a general who slaughtered many an enemy, and Caesar did
just that; but the mob would show greater support for a general who—so far as they knew—
had very few losses.
Caesar discusses his primary motives openly, yet they alone do not seem to warrant his rash
actions. Understandably, the elimination of British support to the Gauls was crucial, and an
observation of Britain for a forthcoming invasion would be priceless. However, as shown
above, other motives played an important role in the timing of the expedition. Caesar wanted
revenge, felt untouchable, and sought riches and power, and justifiably, he mentions none of
these secondary motives.
Caesar clearly felt invincible after the campaign season of 55 B.C.E. He had, in four
years, conquered a majority of Gaul, crossed the Rhine, and stretched his power to the edge
of the Roman world. He was now seeking retribution from the British for their support of the
Gauls, but in what form? Blood, booty, and political clout in Gaul were paramount.
However, he mentions only revenge, because to do so might have damaged his dignitas.

15
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Clearly the first British campaign in 55 B.C.E. posed logistical and tactical problems.
Caesar was overzealous in his assessment that the British expedition might achieve its
primary goal within the short time remaining that summer. Moreover, he complicated the
situation by proceeding without reliable intelligence and his cavalry. Additionally, he
conceals many of his motives. Ultimately, the British expedition is a marquee example of
“creative recording.” However, the focus should not be, on whether Caesar falsified his
accounts on occasion, but on what a general of Caesar’s stature had to gain from such an
inaccurate account of events?

The Efficacy of Commentarii:
To understand accurately the social gains Caesar made through the Commentarii de Bello
Gallico, we must first consider his political goals. Second, we must put Caesar’s
Commentarii into perspective by demonstrating the political value of the British account and
of the work as a whole. Ultimately, it will be clear that Caesar was a calculating, methodical
politician, who upon his return from Gaul had become an authoritarian dictator whom
history must hold accountable for the fall of the Roman republic.
Caesar had two clear goals at the commencement of his Gallic campaign: the first
was to rid himself of his political allies, namely Pompey and Crassus. Although they were
valuable, because they made accessible large amounts of political, military, and financial
assistance, they also posed an obstacle to Caesar’s individual rule. Thus, the campaign in
Gaul offered a chance to succeed without their contributions, ultimately leaving Caesar
alone as the first man in Rome.

16
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Second, Caesar wanted not merely political power but total rule. He had labored in
Rome bureaucratically in 59 as consul, and had found it a hindrance. The legislation he
proposed fell on deaf ears, thus compromising the triumvirate. In turn, Caesar was forced to
use intimidation to accomplish his goals.24 However, with sole power, Caesar would offset
the inconvenient elements of Rome, while maintaining the control a general of his stature
desired.
Caesar at no time let his final goal fall out of sight. Even with his appointment to
Gaul, he stayed politically astute and well informed about affairs in Rome. His survival was
dependent on his ability to mold the political scene of Rome, keep his name at the forefront,
and limit the power of his opponents.25 This was the point of his Commentarii; they offered
him an opportunity to be “present in many places at once.”26 Moreover, they gave him an
extensive range to maneuver when considering what to record and what to omit. Because
Caesar was both the subject and the author of this history, it allowed him a distinct
advantage: to utilize a key element of warfare in politics as well, the element of deception.27
With the crossing to Britain, Caesar had done something no other Roman had accomplished;
he had touched a land that was virtually unheard of, and his Commentarii allowed him to
relay that feat to the Roman people very quickly, because he had set up a very efficient and
reliable courier service, enabling him not only to inform the Roman public of his
accomplishments, but also to stay informed of Rome’s political landscape.28

24

Meier, 213.
Meier, 224
26
Ibid.
27
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. T. Cleary (Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, 1988), 49.
28
Meier, 224.
25
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The true value of Caesar’s Commentarii cannot be measured by mere reference to its
uses. Through them, Caesar issued his version of the truth both to the masses and the
aristocracy. The British landing was a calculated account of Caesar’s grandeur as a general
and as a Roman citizen. The Britain crossing was a cultural representation of Roman
greatness. Additionally, the British expedition “reinforced the existence of Roman
culture,”29 to the Roman people: “to assert the existence of somewhere that is not Roman is
to reinforce the existence of Roman culture as a construct. But the distinction only becomes
clear when the boundary is crossed.”30 In physical terms, that meant crossing the British
channel. This might offer an explanation to Caesar’s haste; he may have simply wanted to
step on the island, not only to conduct a reconnaissance of the island for a future campaign,
but also to demonstrate the superiority of the Roman civilization, to both Britons and
Romans alike.
Moreover, it is understandable that Caesar slanted his mistakes; surely he wanted to
maintain his credibility back in Rome. But more importantly, he wanted to demonstrate
Rome’s greatness. Caesar carefully considered his options and opted, like any good general,
for the most advantageous.31 This is why he omits any mention of gold or silver as a motive
for action; some might have considered him petty to conquer simply for profit, or treasonous
to put Roman solders in harm’s way for personal gain. In essence, Caesar employed his
commentarii as propaganda to persuade readers of his position,32 thus increasing his political
clout.

29

Stewart, 6.
Ibid.
31
Tzu, 48.
32
J. P. V. D. Balsdon, “The Veracity of Caesar,” Greece & Rome, 2nd Ser. 4. (March 1957), 23.
30
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Caesar used the governorship of Gallia Cisalpina as the foundation for his future
conquests. Every step is justified in his Commentarii, and the Roman public would have
been eager to hear of his next victory. Many Romans saw Britain as an exotic place, as
indicated by Catullus’ poem 11.33 With Caesar’s landing in Britain he had touched the end
of the world; the Roman public would have marveled at that feat. His Commentarii allowed
for a justification of his actions, a manipulation of the public, and the ensuring of eternal
reverence. Caesar was a very accomplished writer and orator, and he reserved his best
written work for the Commentarii de Bello Gallico, not out of vanity, but because it offered
him a large audience and even larger socio-political gains.

Conclusion:
Gaius Julius Caesar was a shrewd statesman who employed his great skills in military
matters, writing, and politics to catapult him to the forefront of the Roman political scene.
He showed great political promise at an early age. He presented the report of the British
landing as a firsthand account (though written in the third person) of the expedition, by the
commander of the Roman army. However, as I have shown, in his account he chose to focus
only on aspects that offered political gains, rather than submitting an honest account of his
failures and true motives. Pragmatically, these omissions were grounded in Caesar’s
political goals. Ultimately, Caesar employed the Commentarii de Bello Gallico
magnificently; he projected an inaccurate account to the Roman public, became dictator for
life, and was offered the diadem of kingship weeks before his death in 44 B.C.E. In the end,
Caesar sealed his own fate. He had become so threatening to Rome that many of his own
33
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men assisted in his assassination, labeling the greatest general in Roman history a tyrant. In
fact, he was just that, a tyrannical, arrogant, sadistic leader bent on total domination, which
he did achieve, if only for a short while.i

Fig. 1

Fig. 2
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